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Already in his earlier works Levinas proposes a distinct phenomenological project which takes 
into consideration the radicality of the other and otherness by questioning intentionality and the 
validity of intersubjectivity within intentional consciousness. His move “towards Heidegger and 
against Husserl” was due primarily to Heidegger’s Dasein analysis, understanding of Being and 
being-with. However, in his major work, Totality and Infinity, Levinas proposes a new perspective 
on reading intersubjective relations with the Other which strongly contrasts with the 
Heideggerian concept of intersubjectivity. This paper addresses the question of the Other, 
intersubjectivity and ethics in the writings of Levinas and Heidegger respectively. It considers 
Levinas’s critique of intersubjectivity as provoked and developed by Heidegger’s analytic of 
Dasein, and concentrates on Levinas’s specific understanding of intentionality in his account of 
metaphysics, metaphysical desire and the Other. It  also takes up the question of temporality as a 
necessary condition for intersubjective relation and explores its implication for the self and the 




The main questions for both Levinas and Heidegger 
are the meaning of being, the mode of its 
presentation, and how we, as historical temporal 
beings, can understand this phenomenon (Levinas, 
1985, p. 38). Heidegger takes account of the facticity 
of being through a peculiar shift towards an analysis 
of human being as what he calls Dasein. A particular 
characteristic of Dasein is its situatedness in time and 
space. Situatedness is revealed as an inescapable 
condition that makes it possible for the truth of being 
to be disclosed. Being is experienced from within 
Dasein’s understanding of it (Heidegger, 1927/1995, 
pp. 32-33). Thus, the understanding of being is a main 
feature of Dasein.  
 
The importance of Heidegger’s philosophy within 
Levinas’s problematic of ethics can be described as 
follows: the understanding of being is constituted by 
the fact that it is already engaged in time and history, 
without recourse to the absolute self or the freedom 
bestowed by the phenomenological reduction. The 
ethical significance this was to assume for Levinas is 
pointed to in “The Work of Husserl” (1940): 
 
For Heidegger this existence certainly has a 
meaning – and by affirming the meaning of 
existence, which does not have for him the 
opaqueness of a brute fact, Heidegger 
remains a phenomenologist – but this 
meaning no longer has the structure of a 
noema. The subject is neither free nor 
absolute; [he] is no longer entirely 
answerable for [him]self. [He] is dominated 
and overwhelmed by history, by [his] 
origins, about which [he] can do nothing, 
since he is thrown into the world and his 
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abandonment marks all [his] projects and 
powers. (Levinas, 1940/1998a, p. 84) 
 
What Levinas finds in Heidegger’s philosophy is that 
ontology and phenomenology are not opposed to each 
other. Heidegger is concerned with two tasks: 
fundamental ontology and the description of 
experience. Levinas writes that Heidegger’s Sein und 
Zeit (1927) “aims at describing man’s being or 
existing – not his nature” (Levinas, 1985, p. 40). The 
critical claim here is that Heidegger’s philosophy is 
directed mainly towards the explanation of the 
relation between being and beings.  
 
In contrast to Heidegger, Levinas seeks for the 
possibility of disclosing the relation to the Other 
which could exceed the question of being and move 
to the question of the nature of subjectivity and its 
relation to the true Other. Does the search for the 
meaning of being miss something which may be even 
more fundamental? His critical approach leads to his 
revising of the European tradition of philosophical 
thinking.  
 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas furthermore espouses 
the notion that the history of European philosophy 
represents a history of violence towards the Other 
insofar as alterity was always reduced to the same, in 
the sense of cognition intending to subsume the other 
into the sphere of absolute knowledge (Levinas, 1961/ 
2004, pp. 24-25). The relation between the classical 
paradigm and Levinas’s philosophical tradition is 
partly analyzed in Derrida’s essay “Violence and 
Metaphysics” (1967/1981). Derrida states that the 
specificity of Levinas’s thought can be explained by 
his desire to liberate thinking from the domination of 
the same and the self: 
 
the thought which … seeks to liberate itself 
from the Greek domination of the Same 
and the One … as if from oppression itself 
– an oppression certainly comparable to 
none other in the world, an ontological or 
transcendental oppression, but also the 
origin or alibi of all oppression in the 
world. A thought, finally, which seeks to 
liberate itself from a philosophy … which 
“is fixed in the concept of totality which 
dominates Western philosophy”. (Derrida, 
1967/1981, p. 83) 
 
For Levinas, the charge lies not only in the 
transformation of ontology into ethical metaphysics, 
but, more specifically, in revising the notion of 
intentionality through the concept of metaphysical 
desire. His own understanding of ethics arises from 
this new concept of intentionality.  
 
From Levinas’s point of view, however, the idea of 
metaphysics is to aim at the other and alterity as a 
source of transcendence (Levinas, 1974/1981, p.120). 
Levinas’s project is not about destruction of the 
traditional concept of metaphysics, but an attempt to 
keep its positive meaning. Already the title of his 
provocative work Totality and Infinity announces the 
desire for changes. It marks the final stage of 
metaphysics, or the so-called final form in which it 
reaches itself. I would argue that the possibility of 
such a transformation is rooted in the reconsideration 
of the notion of intentionality that occurs through 
Levinas’s concept of metaphysical desire. 
 
According to Levinas, metaphysical desire differs in 
nature from need (Levinas, 1961/2004, p. 117). It is a 
distinction to which the tradition of European 
philosophy has been inattentive. When the subject 
experiences need, the relation between the I and its 
need can be described in terms of a lack. In need, 
such as hunger, that which confronts me as other 
(food, for example) becomes a part of me (Levinas, 
1961/2004, pp. 33-34). As Levinas puts it, “their 
alterity is therefore reabsorbed into my own identity” 
(Levinas, 1961/2004, p. 33). To need something is 
thus to relate to something outside myself in such a 
way as to negate its alterity. 
 
In Totality and Infinity, metaphysical desire is 
presented as a desire for absolute alterity; it is a 
movement to exteriority and otherness (Levinas, 
1961/2004, p. 82). As Levinas elucidates, “desire 
does not coincide with an unsatisfied need; it is 
situated beyond satisfaction and nonsatisfaction” 
(Levinas, 1961/2004, p. 179). This desire is the form 
of man’s transcendental relation to the Other. It 
differs from ordinary desire as the task which is to be 
satisfied, in which case the desirable is “bread I eat, 
the land in which I dwell, the landscape I 
contemplate” (Levinas, 1961/2004, p. 33). In contrast, 
metaphysical desire “tends toward something else 
entirely, toward the absolutely other” (Levinas, 1961/ 
2004, p. 33). 
 
Contrary to Peperzak’s position, I would agree with 
Drabinski (2001, pp. 110) that desire does not link 
itself with the specific figure of the human face 
(Peperzak, 1993, p. 68), with my interpretation of 
metaphysical desire supporting Drabinski’s reading of 
it (Drabinski, 2001, pp. 110-111). Accordingly, I 
maintain, along with Drabinski, that “the movement 
of metaphysical desire manifests a mode of 
relationality where subjectivity is no longer bound to 
itself ... . This decentred I is capable of transcending 
... the economy of representation”. I further maintain 
along with Drabinski that in metaphysical desire 
subjectivity opens up towards exteriority, infinity and 
otherness in general, but not towards the particular 
Other specified as a human being. What Drabinski 
discovers in the notion of metaphysical desire is thus 
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a specific logic of desire that “aims at the alterity of 
the absolutely other, aims at describing a concrete 
relation of transcendence as such – transcendence 
without the specificity of the human other” 
(Drabinski, 2001, p. 111). 
 
In the concept of metaphysical desire, Levinas tries to 
retain the structure of intentionality to which Husserl 
gave primacy. However, in moving toward the 
absolutely other, metaphysical Desire does not return 
to the egoistic life as its animating origin. The desire 
is a supra-ontological transcendence towards the 
Other: “a passivity, or passion, in which Desire is 
recognized, in which the ‘more in the less’ awakens 
with its most ardent, most noble, and most ancient 
flame, a thought to think more than it can think” 
(Levinas, 1982/1994, p. 67). Husserl’s failure is, 
according to Levinas, to assume the adequacy of the 
intending to the intended, an assumption that traduces 
alterity by interiorizing the Other. For Levinas, the 
underlying structure of intentionality presupposes an 
intention in which the intended goes beyond 
intention. This intention is metaphysical desire. 
Levinas writes: “desire has another intention; it 
desires beyond everything that can simply complete 
it” (Levinas, 1961/2004, pp. 34-35).  
 
Metaphysical desire is deeply rooted in the structure 
of intentionality. Thus far, it is dissatisfied, since 
consciousness is always consciousness of (in its 
essence intentionality). The positive side of this being 
dissatisfied is the possibility of the exteriority of 
consciousness. Desire allows consciousness to intend 
the Other without reducing it or comprehending it. 
Comprehension would be a satisfaction of the 
desirable; as such, it is bound up with the ordinary 
wish. The metaphysical desire resists the integration 
of the other into the sphere of consciousness, it is 
always exterior, and thus it breaks with the 
philosophy of identity. This brings me to the most 
decisive point: the movement of Desire does not 
derive the Other from the constitutional work of the 
Same, but, following Drabinski’s interpretation, keeps 
the radical difference which is carried by the very 
movement of Desire and only deepens transcendence 
as such (Drabinski, 2001, p. 112). It is exactly here 
that I approach the Levinasian definition of 
metaphysics: as the movement towards transcendental 
being. Due to metaphysical desire, metaphysics itself 
applies a conceptual distance between the other and 
consciousness. Being, beings and exteriority, and, 
consequently, transcendence, are already included in 
metaphysics. Thus, being directed towards being as 
such is being aimed at alterity and at transcendence.  
 
Levinas’s criticism of Western philosophy is now 
clarified: for a long time the tradition of philosophical 
thinking has hidden the true essence of metaphysics, 
that is, the desire for alterity. 
There are two reasons for this oblivion of 
metaphysics. The absolute other was thought in a 
negative way, and the understanding of being was the 
key moment of the thinking being. Metaphysics is 
interpreted differently in Levinas’s philosophy, which 
views the task of metaphysics as being to intend 
towards the other and alterity: “philosophy presents 
itself as a realization of being. In this work [Totality 
and Infinity] metaphysics has an entirely different 
meaning. If its movement leads to transcendence as 
such, transcendence means not appropriation of what 
is, but its respect” (Levinas, 1961/2004, p. 302). The 
natural completion of metaphysics is ethics, since 
only in the ethical relation is the Other presented to 
consciousness in all its irreducible otherness (Levinas, 
1961/2004, p. 300). Levinas does not deny the 
tradition of metaphysical thinking, but gives it a new 
dimension. In other words, to understand being means 
to find the possibility of an ethical relation with the 
Other. 
 
The concept of metaphysical desire, being the key 
notion for Levinas’s interpretation of metaphysics, is, 
at the same time, an attempt to renew an under-
standing of intentionality and to reveal the possibility 
of the Other for intentional consciousness. Heidegger, 
however, not only also proposed a new dimension of 
intentionality and phenomenology, but was one of the 
first philosophers to undertake the attempt of 
criticizing the tradition of metaphysical thinking. Yet, 
despite the great influence of Heidegger, the 
philosophical project of Levinas is different. 
  
According to Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition 
was not able to approach the question of the essence 
of being, since its attention was directed to beings 
(existents) (Heidegger, 1927/1995, pp. 28-31, 32-35). 
Each region of ontic thought assumes the under-
standing of being, a certain ontology that defines the 
being that it studies. Heidegger proposed the project 
of fundamental ontology in order to discover the 
sense of being in general – something that is 
presupposed in every ontic science. To realize this 
task, Heidegger starts from an altogether different 
point of reflection.  
 
Fundamental ontology can be accomplished by 
considering a particular being before it is defined by 
scientific study. This being, as pointed out earlier, is 
Dasein. It represents what we are before our being is 
considered within any scientific tradition. What needs 
to be noted is that, according to Heidegger, Dasein is 
the continuous presence of being in every concrete 
situation of human life. Man is the only being that is 
capable of comprehending its being. It is only for man 
that being has its continuous actuality. Dasein is 
described as the topos of being’s actualisation in the 
world of being (of existents). However, Dasein is not 
identical with the empirical I. Nonetheless, Heidegger 
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indeed brings the I within the sphere of Dasein. 
Being-in-the-world has three unfolding aspects: 
being-one’s-Self (Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 163), 
“being-in” and “world”. Being-in corresponds to the 
“there” and is indicated by thrownness, and the world 
itself is bounded by thrownness. 
 
What is the meaning of the self (Ich-selbst)? The self 
can be interpreted as my own Dasein project and as a 
possibility and a basis for questioning. Dasein is the 
topos of understanding being as such (Heidegger, 
1927/1995, pp. 182-186). It is the presence of the 
objective sense of being in the space of men, where 
being is opened towards the being. Being is 
uninterruptedly actualized and reproduced in the 
existential facticity of Dasein that, in its turn, goes 
beyond itself, reflecting by this act the openness of 
being in itself. Thus, according to Heidegger, Dasein 
is a being that understands its being in the sense that it 
is always correlated with its being. It is a ground for 
realization in the project of fundamental ontology. To 
confirm this, we can adduce two proofs. Firstly, 
Dasein is the essence that is capable of asking about 
its being; it is its very modus of existence. Secondly, 
the main characteristic of Dasein is being-in-the-
world. With this we have achieved a preliminary 
conception of the analytic of Dasein. 
 
I should note here that Heidegger does not really 
ignore the other, but, by introducing Dasein, he 
promotes the self which subjects the other to the 
question of being. To put it differently, Heidegger 
indeed speaks about the other as the “other-side” of 
that authentic Being which Dasein already is 
(Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 328). It can thus be 
concluded that, for Levinas, the meaning of the new 
philosophy (philosophy after phenomenology and 
after metaphysics) is to find the way to transcendence 
through ethics, whereas for Heidegger the new 
philosophical project is the analytic of Dasein’s 
facticity, its main modus of existence, the ability to 
question, and being-in-the-world (Taminiaux, 1989/ 
1991, p. 40). In a narrower sense, Being and Time 
implies research on the theme of the being of the 
being, while the other being is simply human being 
caught within the concept of being-in-the-world. 
Here, the understanding of being implies two 
moments. Firstly, it is questioning about being, and, 
secondly, it is Dasein that exists on its own 
(Heidegger, 1925/1992, p. 115). This thesis Levinas 
cannot accept. The way the question of being is 
articulated allows for a sort of incursion into the 
sphere of otherness. 
 
This questioning has two sides: it is an understanding 
that happens in advance, and it is its interpretation 
which probes the original structures of understanding. 
Being is opened for understanding in such a way that, 
for further consideration, we should interpret this 
everyday comprehension of being. Being a certain 
movement, the interpretation is not a transition to 
something which is different, but a discovering of 
existence as it is. It is the becoming of existence. In 
other words, the interpretation is the self-becoming of 
the comprehension of being. In this case, the question 
about being is existence in the framework of what is 
already understood. According to Heidegger, these 
two sides of the questioning can be explained by three 
components which fulfil it. These are: what is asked, 
what should be revealed in the process of questioning, 
and toward what it is directed. The first element is 
being that is disclosed in the understanding. The 
second element is the sense of being which is the 
thematizing of the understanding. The goal of 
interpretation is to realize the movement from 
comprehension of being to its sense. We can also say 
that, in the questioning, we move from what we ask to 
what is asked and then to who asks. First, the being is 
asked about its being. In this case we ask about the 
attitude to being. It is not a question about who asks, 
but about an attitude to being. Such a development in 
the question designates exactly the comprehension of 
being. The next step is to make clear how the 
interpretation of the received sense comes forth. 
Indeed, our understanding of any sense is formed by 
interpretation. What needs to be remembered is that 
being meets the being only on the way towards the 
comprehension of being. Since the very moment 
when the being is in a certain space – thanks to which 
the aiming at being is possible – the question about 
being is no longer aimed at the single being. 
 
How do the being and being meet each other inside 
existence, in Dasein? In the methodological 
construction of transcendental phenomenology, the 
constitution of the alter ego rests on the constitution 
of the thing-world. We find the same in Being and 
Time: analysis of the ready-to-hand and the present-
to-hand methodologically precedes the analysis of 
Dasein-with and the with-world.  
 
What is important in Levinas’s disagreement with 
Heidegger´s position is that Dasein meets the being as 
a sort of instrument It uses in life (Heidegger, 1927/ 
1995, pp. 406-407). This being, discovered by 
Dasein, exists only in relation to totality, of which 
this being becomes a part. For Dasein, to meet the 
being does not mean to put the world aside, but to be 
involved in the world and to use it. However, 
Theunissen stresses a few similarities in Heidegger’s 
and Husserl’s reading of the Other (Theunissen, 1965/ 
1984, p. 181). Firstly, Husserl sees the Other as a 
subject for the world which is more original than the 
world. Secondly, the Other is objective being within 
the world. In Being and Time, being-in-the-world and 
inner-world beings rest on being-in-the-world where 
the Other is in the world with me.  
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To allow the being to be involved in the world creates 
the condition on the basis of which Dasein meets the 
being in its being. This thesis states that, before 
Dasein has met the being, the world has been 
disclosed. Heidegger does not try to show a specific 
form of the intersubjective relation; his intention is to 
show a conceptual attitude towards the world 
(Heidegger, 1927/1995, §§ 55, 56, 57). The world 
does not represent any being or community of beings, 
but is the special context of relations and a unity of 
different possibilities of participation in it. This world 
context in which the being can be met Heidegger 
names significance (Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 120). 
Since Dasein understands the world by its referents, it 
is a source of significance. In such a world the being 
has a meaning to the extent that it is signified by 
Dasein, which already is a special context of 
understanding (Heidegger, 1927/1995, pp. 118-119). 
Thus, on its own, the being does not have any 
meaning and is not a source of meaning. Meaning is a 
product formed by Dasein. 
 
Moreover, I should add that Dasein understands the 
world within its temporal structure. Heidegger claims 
that time is the horizon for all understanding of being 
and for interpreting it (Heidegger, 1927/1995, pp. 
351, 352). We need to explicate time as the horizon 
for the understanding of being in terms of 
temporality, as the being of Dasein. Heidegger holds 
that this projection presupposes a temporal openness 
or clearing of being itself. In other words, the 
temporality of Dasein mirrors the temporality of 
being. Since we can discover in the temporality of 
Dasein only the mirror image of the temporality of 
being, being as such remains concealed. In general, 
for Heidegger, temporality is the condition of being, 
and time is the site where the drama of the 
comprehension of being by Dasein takes place. 
Levinas writes: “the fundamental relation with being, 
in Heidegger, is not the relationship with the Other, 
but with death, where everything that is non-authentic 
in the relationship with the Other is denounced, since 
one dies alone” (Levinas, 1985, p. 58). Levinas’s 
argument here is that Dasein exists only in dialogue 
with being. The fundamental encounter for the 
existent is not with other beings, but with being itself. 
Here, temporality is a condition of encounter, but, 
according to Levinas, it does not represent the 
possibility of a radical transformation of Dasein after 
its understanding of being. Levinas’s own view on 
this point is that time should be understood as the 
condition of encounter with the Other:  
 
Relationship with the future, the presence 
of the future in the present, seems all the 
same accomplished in the face-to-face with 
the Other. The situation of the face-to-face 
would be the very accomplishment of time. 
(Levinas, 1979/1985a, p. 77) 
The main thesis by Levinas in Time and the Other is 
that the attempt to think of time is “a relation which 
does not allow itself to be assimilated by experience; 
or to that which – of itself infinite – would allow itself 
to be comprehended” (Levinas, 1979/1985a, p. 32). 
Does Heidegger link temporality with ethics?  
 
In response to Levinas, Lingis in Deathbound 
Subjectivity emphasizes that the sense of conscience 
and the sense of morality are anticipatory; that is, 
conscience calls me unto being, I have to become. To 
put it differently, conscience anticipates the limits of 
the possible, the possibility of impossibility: “Once 
one has anticipated one’s death one has anticipated 
what is possible, all that is possible” (Lingis, 1989, p. 
113). For Heidegger, as Lingis shows, the sense of the 
possible and the sense of the ethical are the same 
thing; moreover, they are the veritable sense of the 
future. Lingis proceeds to situate morality within the 
moment of the present. The sense of morality is to be 
found in the vertical dimension of immanence. It is 
what we absolutely could not get a hold on (Lingis, 
1989, p. 114). However, Heidegger places focus on 
the future. He identifies the original and veritable 
sense of the future with the sense of the possible 
(Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 286). To grasp the sense of 
the future is to have a sense of the possible – that is, 
not what we represent to ourselves by prolonging the 
lines of the actual, but what comes of itself 
(Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 291). A specific kind of 
future which can be bound to the Levinasian 
understanding is distinguished by Lingis: The future 
is what comes to us, and not what we produce. In 
Levinas’s reading, the future comes from the Other. 
For Heidegger, it is not that we have a sense of our 
death in the future, but that we have a sense of the 
future in our sense of death. To clarify this thesis, 
Lingis adds: “we anticipate a sense of our future in 
that dimension of immanence upon which our moral 
anxiety opens” (Lingis, 1989, p. 114). 
 
Yet, for Levinas, Heidegger is a philosopher who 
turned phenomenology from absolute pure conscious-
ness towards everyday life and introduced Dasein as a 
being with others. In other words, the being of Dasein 
must be understood as a being with others 
(Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 219). Thus, being is 
qualified by the Heideggerian notion mitsein, being 
with. Heidegger’s position seems very attractive to 
Levinas, because Dasein, by virtue of existing in an 
intersubjective space with others, is not, as in 
Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity, conceived as a 
reflection of my consciousness.  
 
However, Heidegger’s ontological project reveals that 
he is interested in modes of being rather than in 
empirical encounters. The empirical presence or 
absence of others can be ontically important 
(important to us as individuals), but it is absolutely 
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meaningless from an ontological point of view: 
“Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein 
even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or 
perceived. Even Dasein’s being alone is being-with in 
the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a 
being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of being-
with; its very possibility is the proof of this” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 156). 
 
Being-with others is not, thus, an encounter with the 
Other in the everyday sense. It characterizes the 
relationship of Dasein with being, but not of beings 
with one another (Heidegger, 1927/1995, p. 157). 
Levinas claims that being-with-others discloses the 
solitariness of Dasein. Also, it is not clear if the 
encounter with the Other is entailed by the notion of 
being-with. The intersubjective world as a community 
and sociality is part of the relation of Dasein to being, 
rather than a relation with something totally other. 
That is why Dasein remains solitary. On this account 
Levinas writes: “Just as in all the philosophies of 
communion, sociality in Heidegger is found in the 
subject alone; and it is in terms of solitude that the 
analysis of Dasein in its authentic form is pursued” 
(Levinas, 1979/1985a, p. 93).  
 
“Being-with” and “towards the Other” are rooted 
deeply in Dasein’s structure. Being with, which is 
terminologically identical to being with the Other as 
well as to Dasein-with, is supposed to be already 
given with the being-in-the-world of Dasein. 
Heidegger (1927/1995) clarifies that the question of 
being-with “leads to structures of Dasein that are 
equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: Being-with 
and Dasein-with (Mitdasein)” (p. 149). Following 
Heidegger’s intention, being-in-the-world is just as 
original as being-with, and, what is more, the being-
in-the-world of Dasein is constituted through being-
with. To put it differently, being-with is a constitutive 
moment of what is in itself being-in-the-world.  
 
Theunissen stresses that being-with is disclosed 
through “caring for”, which should be interpreted as 
the being-with of being with Others. What differs in 
Heidegger’s theory from that of Husserl is that the I is 
never given with the Other. Accordingly, Theunissen 
recognizes that “only those who cut the I off the 
Other must latch onto ‘empathy’ as that act that is 
supposed to instate the initially absent bond between 
the I and the Other” (Theunissen, 1965/1984, p. 175). 
The focus is placed on the connection between social 
ontology and Dasein theory. Specifically, Theunissen 
suggests that, when the Other is not found, the I still 
exists as being-with. Actually, it demonstrates that 
being-with has little to do with the coming together of 
subjects and is instead merely another modification of 
being alone. Heidegger’s contribution to the theory of 
intersubjectivity consists in bringing it to another 
plane – in particular, the existential. 
Now Levinas’s critique of Dasein takes a distinct 
shape. An entire encounter with the Other takes place 
within the world and is subjected to Dasein’s own 
projection. As Theunissen has pointed out, the Other 
can only be encountered within the world. The 
ontological meaning is constituted in the total 
structure of Dasein where the Other has to be aligned 
with the self or with me. Theunissen insists on the 
impossibility of distinguishing the Other as radical 
otherness (Theunissen, 1965/1984, pp. 175-177). In 
Heidegger’s view, it is always my relation to the 
Other, in that the Other remains one of the inner-
world entities and is grasped in my world project – 
and thus not, as Husserl showed in his theory of 
intersubjectivity, as the relation of the Other to me. 
 
According to Levinas, in Heidegger’s analytic of 
Dasein the other and the being can be revealed only 
within a grasping and comprehending horizon which 
evaluates only the same (Levinas, 1961/2004, p. 45). 
The understanding of being affirms the priority of 
being over the being. It subjects the relations with the 
other to the being of the being which is to master the 
other: “in subordinating every relation with existents 
to the relation with Being the Heideggerian ontology 
affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics. ... 
freedom comes from an obedience to Being” 
(Levinas, 1961/2004, p. 45). The understanding of 
being still is the thinking of the same, since the same 
understands first of all neutral and anonymous being. 
I never meet absolute alterity, because the existent as 
such is only with respect to the universality of being. 
The existent which is approached by virtue of the 
openness of being, is never fully existent, but is the 
existent within the context of the world or within the 
horizon of being. For the understanding being, the 
existent has to reveal itself by emanating itself. 
However, the existent appears within the world 
context. Since Dasein is always directed to the 
anonymity and neutrality of being, it is never in the 
situation of total surprise when encountering some 
phenomenon. Dasein is incapable of meeting an 
existent that is totally alien to it. The neutrality of 
being excludes entirely the difference that separates 
the same and the other. But the ethical encounter of 
self and Other cannot be explained by the ontic-
ontological difference between existent and Being. 
Thus, Levinas finds himself faced with the necessity 
of taking into consideration two philosophical 
approaches: Husserl’s philosophy of transcendental 
consciousness on the one hand, and, on the other, 
Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. 
 
At this point, it can be stated, in brief, that Heidegger 
and Levinas propose two different projects for the 
phenomenological inquiry into subjectivity. Whereas 
the main idea of the Heideggerian fundamental 
ontology is the questioning of being, that is, of the “to 
be”, Levinas intends to put metaphysics on the ground 
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of ethics by questioning responsible subjectivity.  
 
I have attempted to trace Heidegger’s place in 
Levinas’s project of ethics. However, one could ask if 
Heidegger has articulated the ethical within his 
philosophy of Dasein. As is well known, Heidegger 
wrote nothing specifically devoted to the question of 
ethics. On the contrary, his work is widely reputed to 
be rich in ontological speculation but entirely 
unhelpful regarding moral conduct or social equity. In 
his “Letter on Humanism”, ethics, or the demand to 
formulate an ethical theory, is specifically subordi-
nated to the question of being. Much in the early 
Heidegger has seemed promising for an investigation 
of ethics. But there is also a good deal of suspicion 
about the ethical possibilities in Heidegger. I would 
like to attempt some reflections on ethics and 
ontology. But where to put the point of articulation 
between ethics and ontology? As Tugendhat puts it, to 
clear up the sense of Being one should ask about the 
sense of human life – its aim and its end (Tugendhat, 
1979/1995, p. 139). This question of Being is taken as 
a hermeneutical question of life’s facticity which is 
exactly at issue. In this sense, ethics is considered to 
be a discursive system through which philosophy 
tends to accomplish truth.  
 
From the very first lines, “Letter on Humanism” 
presents a deep reflection on action. The question of 
humanism is developed as a clarification of the truth 
through an understanding of man acting and 
conducting himself. Besides the crucial issue of 
tracing the genesis of Heidegger’s Dasein theory, 
there is also an entire rethinking of ethics. 
Heidegger’s interpretation or attitude to the reading of 
ethics is similar in approach to his approach to logos 
and physics. Heidegger’s central point here is that, 
before scholars started the demarcation of philosophy 
into ethics, logic and physics, ancient thinkers did not 
know ethics as a separate region of inquiry. However, 
this does not indicate the unethical in their thinking; 
on the contrary, Heidegger claims, the tragedies of 
Sophocles and the sayings of Heraclitus had informed 
and debated the original question of ethos before 
Aristotle introduced his Ethics. Heidegger applies the 
Aristotelian sense of ethics, which is episteme ethike 
– science of ethos – and this ethos needs to be thought 
of as “abode” (Heidegger, 1947/1993, p. 256). In 
“Letter on Humanism”, Heidegger unfolds ethos as 
what can be called an abode, a dwelling place. The 
abode is the “there” in that it is open. Nancy makes an 
interesting remark that the abode is “thus as much a 
conduct [as] a residence (or rather, ‘residing’ is above 
all a conduct, the conduct of Being-the-there)” 
(Nancy, 1996/2002, p. 67). The fundamental meaning 
of ethics is thought of in terms of the abode of man: it 
is a familiar and everyday place where the human 
being dwells and comes to stand out, to ek-sist, and to 
ask about the truth of Being. For Heidegger, originary 
ethics is human dwelling thought upon the horizon of 
the truth of Being. 
 
The difficult issue in Heidegger’s ethics is taken up in 
Nancy’s article on “Heidegger’s ‘Originary Ethics’”. 
Acting man does not point to a specific aspect of 
being, but, as Nancy explains, it is his very Being 
itself, and thus it discloses an ethics as the thinking of 
being. In its conducting, Dasein brings into play the 
very meaning of Being. As Heidegger clarifies in Sein 
und Zeit, Dasein is the being for which “in its very 
Being, that Being is at issue for it” (Heidegger, 1927/ 
1995, p. 12). The turning point in the thought of 
Heidegger’s ethics is that Dasein, while being opened, 
is called to an essential and active relation with the 
proper fact of Being. Nancy draws attention to the 
ethical character of this relation and that of sense: “in 
Dasein, it is a case of giving sense to the fact of Being 
– or, more exactly, in Dasein the fact of Being is 
making sense” (Nancy, 1996/2002, p. 71). “Making 
sense” is precisely acting and conducting oneself, and 
it is essentially thinking. Thus, as Nancy points out, 
the essential act of ethical action is thinking (Nancy, 
1996/2002, pp. 71-78). In this sense, philosophy does 
not prescribe any norms or values: instead it should 
think the sense of what makes action as such. The 
linkage of thinking and ethics is the ultimate source of 
the bringing into discussion of the notion of 
“originary ethics”. Thinking, as Heidegger observes, 
is anchored in action, precisely because sense is at 
issue in action. It appears that the issue is not to 
reveal thinking as intellectual conduct, but it is an 
enframing of the sense of Being. More specifically, 
the ethics that we are faced with in Heidegger’s 
“Letter on Humanism” refers precisely to existence. 
The focus is placed on anyone’s everyday existence 
that “finds itself requested to make sense” (Nancy, 
1996/2002, p. 71). Only questioning itself gives the 
existent the possibility of discovering norms and 
values in its action. 
 
What is at stake in this critique of Dasein’s action and 
conduct is an attempt at a hermeneutical reading of 
ethics: ethos is a making sense as such. Thinking of 
this hermeneutical conduct is, according to Nancy, 
“originary ethics”. This clarification allows for a final 
comment about the relation between ontology and 
ethics in Heidegger’s philosophy (Heidegger, 1947/ 
1993, pp. 256-257) Thinking, being a thinking of 
ethos as conduct according to the truth of Being, is 
more fundamental than ontology. As Nancy specifies, 
“it does not think ‘beings in their Being’, but ‘the 
truth of Being’” (Nancy, 1996/2002, p. 78). Nancy 
then unfolds what can be called the very ethicality of 
Being: the thinking of Being does not only involve an 
ethics, but it involves itself as an ethics (Nancy, 1996/ 
2002, pp. 78-79). Thus, we can justify the notion that 
the thought of being has an ethical dimension: 
“‘Originary ethics’ is the more appropriate name for 
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‘fundamental ontology’. Ethics properly is what is 
fundamental in fundamental ontology” (Nancy, 1996/ 
2002, p. 78). 
 
The question of ethics is thought as non-metaphysical 
in so far as, for Heidegger, metaphysics has never 
been capable of thinking Being itself without regard 
for Being’s determination in terms of beings and 
entities. Here the distinction between Levinas and 
Heidegger becomes clear: Levinas attempts to make 
ethics “first philosophy” – that is, a metaphysics and 
as such an ethics which is opposed to ontology. As 
Critchley points out, Levinas tends to create a 
metaphysical opposition (Critchley, 1999, p. 15). But 
Heidegger himself would argue that this attempt leads 
us to a continuation of the oblivion of the truth of 
Being that is presupposed and dissimilated by all 
ethico-metaphysical discourse. It appears that the 
issue, in the end, is the characterization of the entire 
onto-theological adventure of Western metaphysics 
(Critchley, 1999, p. 16). 
 
In the discussion of ethics in Levinas and his relation 
to Heidegger, the focus is usually placed on a 
deconstructive analysis of ethics. This problematic 
was elucidated in Critchley’s book on The Ethics of 
Deconstruction: Levinas and Derrida (1999). 
Critchley is careful to insist on the similarity between 
Derrida’s understanding of ethics and Heidegger’s 
understanding as presented in his “Letter on 
Humanism”. What is Derrida’s strategy in reading 
Levinas’s ethics? Derrida’s analysis is meant to imply 
that one must not practice ethics in the usual sense of 
the word, but one must engage in a deconstructive 
analysis of the “ethicity of ethics” (Derrida & 
Labarrière, 1986, p. 71). Thus, Levinas’s project can 
be considered as a calling into question of the value 
of values, which reminds one of the Nietzschean 
enterprise. However, in Derrida’s interpretation, 
Levinas stands outside of all previous ethical accounts 
within the history of European philosophy, even 
including Heidegger’s project. As Derrida puts it: 
“when Levinas speaks of ethics – I would not say that 
this has nothing in common with what has been 
covered over in this world from Greece to the German 
philosophy of the 19th Century, ethics is wholly 
other, and yet it is the same world” (Derrida & 
Labarrière, 1986, p. 71). 
 
To make this claim is basically to think in the context 
of Otherwise than Being, where Levinas argues that 
the thought of the Good beyond Being is a third 
option that exceeds the ontological difference 
between Being and beings (Levinas, 1974/1981, p. 
42). Following Critchley’s interpretation, Levinas’s 
use of the word ethics is a stepping beyond “semantic 
transformation”. We are still dealing with the same 
word and we are employing it in the same way, but, 
as Derrida notices, its meaning has been displaced. In 
his turn, Blanchot adds: “This banal word that 
generally qualifies, in prosaic and bourgeois fashion, 
a man who is mature, lucid and conscious … one 
must try and understand how Levinas has renewed it, 
opened it up to the point of making it signify (beyond 
all sense) the responsibility of an other philosophy” 
(Blanchot, 1980/1986, p. 28). 
 
Why, according to Derrida, can Levinas’s ethics be 
considered a deconstructive project? The argument 
can be found in the following statement by Levinas: 
“The concept of the ego can correspond to me only 
inasmuch as it can signify responsibility, which 
summons me as irreplaceable” (Levinas, 1974/1981, 
p. 126). Here we are dealing with what Levinas calls 
“me voici” (Levinas, 1974/1981, p. 114). This is a 
perspective on the basis of which Derrida makes a 
comment: the word “ethics” is able to exceed its 
traditionally determined domain because of the 
irreducible particularity of my obligation to the 
singular other, prior to procedures of universalization 
and legislation. It is that very obligation of the 
singular other which comes to constitute the ethicality 
of ethics: “The respect for the singularity or the call 
of the other is unable to belong to the domain of 
ethics, to the conventionality and traditionally 
determined domain of ethics” (Derrida & Labarrière, 
1986, p. 71). Critchley notes that Derrida’s principal 
concern is to apply the title “ultra-ethics” to 
Levinasian ethics. He traces a deconstructive attempt 
to displace ethics and bring it into a new dimension 
by locating its condition of possibility in the relation 
to the Other (Critchley, 1999, p. 19). 
 
In brief, I can say that Levinas’s reading of Heidegger 
unfolds in a double movement. Levinasian “Being is 
exteriority” is thought to be human being opened to 
exteriority. For Levinas, it is a metaphysical and 
humanistic determination of the truth or essence of 
Being. Critchley notices that such a determination of 
Being is metaphysical according to a Heideggerian 
account. But, at the very final stage, Levinas fails to 
see the radicality of the question of Being as a 
question, and is thus logically, if not chronologically, 
pre-Heideggerian. According to Critchley, Levinas’s 
texts exceed a metaphysical (in Heidegger’s sense) 
and ontological language of Being as exteriority “in 
order to bring the thought of the other than Being that 
decisively interrupts metaphysics or ontology” 
(Critchley, 1999, p. 19). 
 
To conclude, I claim that, by transforming the notion 
of intentionality through the concept of metaphysical 
desire, Levinas finds an event that happens beyond 
the limits set by the phenomenology of con-
sciousness. As demonstrated in many ways, Levinas 
takes his inspiration from Heidegger’s existential 
analytic of Dasein. For Levinas, as for Heidegger, 
phenomenology develops a philosophical meaning of 
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subjectivity: they both investigate the subject which is 
not an origin of itself or sufficient to itself. However, 
Levinas privileges ethics in the phenomenological 
search for subjectivity and decides that the subject is 
ethical and not existential: “no language other than 
ethical could be equal to the paradox which 
phenomenological description enters” (Levinas, 
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